Presentism and the Spans of Time

Jonathan Tallant; David Ingram; david ingram

doi:10.1111/PHPR.12590

Presentism and the Spans of Time

Jonathan Tallant
, David Ingram
, david ingram

University of Nottingham
University of York

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Original language	American English
Journal	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume	101
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPR.12590
State	Published - Jul 1 2020

Disciplines

Philosophy
Epistemology

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title = "Presentism and the Spans of Time",

author = "Jonathan Tallant and David Ingram and david ingram",

note = "Authors Abstract Presentists, who believe that only present entities exist, face a problem of how to analyse tensed plural quantification. The idea, in broad outline, is that presentists can't employ the usual method for analysing tensed singular quantification, using primitive 'slice' tense operators, to analyse plurals.",

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journal = "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research",

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AU - Tallant, Jonathan

AU - Ingram, David

AU - ingram, david

N1 - Authors Abstract Presentists, who believe that only present entities exist, face a problem of how to analyse tensed plural quantification. The idea, in broad outline, is that presentists can't employ the usual method for analysing tensed singular quantification, using primitive 'slice' tense operators, to analyse plurals.

PY - 2020/7/1

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M3 - Article

VL - 101

JO - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

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Presentism and the Spans of Time

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