Limiting Fundamental Rights to Only Those Founded upon Longstanding History and Tradition Undermines the Court's Legitimacy and Disavows Individual Human Dignity

Vincent J Samar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The Supreme Court's anti-abortion opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's
Health Org., which overruled Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of S.E.
Penn. v. Casey, on the one hand suggests that the Court may be moving
toward eliminating all non-enumerated fundamental rights not deeply
rooted in the Nation's longstanding history and tradition. On the other hand,
it may suggest only that the Court might be just opening the door to
overruling specific non-enumerated rights with which it no longer agrees.
Either way, many long-recognized, non-enumerated, human rights, beyond
abortion that are essential to individual autonomy and human dignity are
now up for grabs. Such rights in the area of privacy law will most likely
include not just abortion, but also contraception, interracial marriage, and
the Court's more recent recognition ofsame-sex marriage, and possibly still
other precedents, including whether states can criminalize adult consensual
same-sex behavior in private. More importantly, the proposed foundation
for this Court's potential departure from its past case precedents cannot be
justified even by claiming such rights are not deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition. As I hope to show in this article, neither from the point
of view of looking to this Nation's longstanding history and traditions, if
properly understood, nor from the point of view of allowing Equal
Protection to aid in identifying forms of discrimination not previously
recognized or afforded much attention, can departures from past human
rights precedents based in autonomy be justified.
Original languageAmerican English
JournalConneticut Public Interest Law Journal
Volume22
Issue number2
StatePublished - 2023

Disciplines

  • Law
  • Public Law and Legal Theory

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